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Abstract 
In “Grids” and “collaboratories,” we find distributed 
communities of resource providers and resource 
consumers, within which often complex and dynamic 
policies govern who can use which resources for which 
purpose. We propose a new approach to the 
representation, maintenance, and enforcement of such 
policies that provides a scalable mechanism for 
specifying and enforcing these policies. Our approach 
allows resource providers to delegate some of the 
authority for maintaining fine-grained access control 
policies to communities, while still maintaining ultimate 
control over their resources. We also describe a prototype 
implementation of this approach and an application in a 
data management context. 
1 Introduction  
The sharing and coordinated use of resources within 
large, dynamic, multi-institutional communities is 
fundamental to an increasing range of computer 
applications, ranging from scientific collaboratories to 
healthcare. This sharing may involve not only file 
exchange but also direct access to computers, software, 
data, and other resources, as is required by a range of 
collaborative problem-solving and resource-brokering 
strategies emerging in industry, science, and engineering. 
This sharing is, necessarily, highly controlled, with 
resource providers and consumers defining clearly and 
carefully just what is shared, who is allowed to share, and 
the conditions under which sharing occurs. 
A set of individuals and/or institutions defined by such 
sharing rules form what has been called a virtual 
community or virtual organization (VO) [1]. 
Infrastructures that support the creation and operation of 
VOs are often called Grids [2]. Specialized Grids focused 
on close and routine interactions between people, 
instruments and information in support of widely 
distributed scientific research projects are often called 
collaboratories [3]. 
 A key problem associated with the formation and 
operation of distributed virtual communities is that of how 
to specify and enforce community policies. Consider the 
situation in which a multi-institutional project has 
received an allocation of time on a shared computational 
resource. With current technologies, each change in 
personnel at participating institutions requires that the 
project leader contact the resource owner to create an 
account and allocation for each new team member.  
Furthermore, as project policies change, the project leader 
will have to go back to the resource provider to adjust 
allocations, rights and priorities for the team members so 
that they are consistent with the current focus of the 
collaboration. This interaction places undue burdens on 
resource providers, who are, in effect, forced to 
implement the policy decisions of the consortium. 
Conversely, these interactions also place significant 
overhead on the administration of the consortium, as 
every policy alteration can require interactions with every 
resource provider with which the project has established a 
relationship. 
Policy enforcement for VOs comprising multiple 
institutions and resource providers imposes unique 
challenges, as follows. 
Scalability. The cost of administering a VO (e.g., 
adding or removing participants, changing community 
policy) should not increase with the number of resource 
providers participating in the VO. Resource 
administration overheads should also be bounded. As 
each VO represents a new policy, it is reasonable to 
require that the cost of administering a resource should be 
proportional to the number of VOs, and not their size or 
dynamics. 
Flexibility and expressibility. Community policy can 
be idiosyncratic. It may apply to sets of resources (e.g., 
restricting what fraction of total storage capability 
available to the VO) and will vary over time. Enforcing 
these agreements and policies in a distributed fashion 
introduces difficult bookkeeping issues. 
Policy Hierarchy. VOs may be hierarchical. For 
example, each institution within a collaboration may wish 
to define its own institutional policy. Each of these nested 
policies must be consistent: institutional policy must be 
consistent with the VO policy, which must in turn be 
consistent with the local policy defined by each resource. 
We argue that the solution to these and related 
problems is to allow resource owners to grant access to 
blocks of resources to a community as a whole, and let the 
community itself manage fine-grained access control 
within that framework. 
We have designed and implemented a Community 
Authorization Service (CAS) that provides this capability. 
A community runs a CAS server to keep track of its 
membership and fine-grained access control policies. A 
user wishing to access community resources contacts the 
CAS server, which delegates rights to the user based on 
the request and the user’s role within the community. 
These rights are in the form of capabilities [4], which 
users can present at a resource to gain access on behalf of 
the community. The user effectively gets the intersection 
of the set of rights granted to the community by the 
resource provider and the set of rights defined by the 
capability granted to the user by the community. 
The CAS architecture builds on public key 
authentication and delegation mechanisms provided by 
the Globus Toolkit [5] Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) 
[6], a widely used set of authentication and authorization 
mechanisms that address single sign on, delegation, and 
credential mapping issues that arise in VO settings. 
As compared to other authorization systems such as 
Akenti [7, 8] and Secure Virtual Enclaves [9], CAS 
provides mechanisms for distributing administration that 
are critical for solving the issues of scalability and 
flexibility. Neuman proposes but does not implement a 
similar idea [10]. 
To date, we have applied CAS to one application, file 
access control. However, we believe that the combination 
of CAS with restricted delegation and standard interfaces 
to policy engines has broad utility in providing a scalable 
policy method for communities, and we and others plan to 
apply it in many other contexts in the near future. 
The rest of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we 
review GSI features essential to understanding our 
implementation of CAS. In Section 3 we discuss the CAS 
architecture in detail. In Section 4 we explain major 
extensions we made to the GSI mechanisms to support 
CAS. In Section 5 we discuss our current implementation. 
In Section 6 we present a case study of integration with a 
real world data access application. In Section 7 we discuss 
security considerations. In Section 8 we review related 
work. In Section 9 we discuss future directions. 
2 Grid Security Infrastructure 
The Globus Toolkit’s Grid Security Infrastructure 
(GSI) [6] has emerged as an essential middleware 
component that has been integrated into many tools, 
including FTP and LDAP servers and clients and remote 
job submission tools. GSI shares with SSH and Kerberos 
the distinction of being a security solution that has been 
deployed at a number of Grids including the NASA 
Information Power Grid [11] and the NSF PACI Grids 
[12, 13]. Like these technologies, GSI consists of a set of 
standard interfaces and protocols and an implementation. 
We summarize here those GSI features needed to 
understand our CAS implementation: proxy credentials, 
delegation, and authorization. 
2.1 Overview 
The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) software is a set 
of libraries and tools that allow users and applications to 
access resources securely. GSI focuses primarily on 
authentication and message protection [14], defining 
single sign-on algorithms and protocols, cross-domain 
authentication protocols, and delegation mechanisms [15-
18] for creating temporary credentials for users and for 
processes executing on a user’s behalf. 
GSI, building on earlier work described in [19], is 
based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and uses 
authentication credentials composed of X.509 certificates 
and private keys. In brief, a GSI user generates a public-
private key pair and obtains an X.509 certificate from a 
trusted entity called a Certificate Authority (CA). These 
credentials then form the basis for authenticating the user 
to resources on the Grid. 
One change from the GSI model described in [19] is 
that GSI now uses temporary credentials called proxy 
credentials. Described in detail in the following 
subsection, proxy credentials allow GSI to support single 
sign-on by allowing users to access resources at multiple 
sites without repeated authentication and to delegate their 
rights to remote processes. This single sign-on capability 
is critical to advanced Grid applications in which a single 
interaction may involve the coordinated use of resources 
at many locations.  
2.2 Proxy Credentials 
In the Grid environment, a user may need to 
authenticate multiple times in a relatively short period of 
time in order to coordinate access to multiple resources. 
Requiring users to type their pass phrase repeatedly is 
undesirable both from a convenience and security 
standpoint, as each decryption of the private key provides 
another opportunity for it to be compromised. 
GSI solves this problem with proxy credentials. A user 
creates a proxy credential by generating a new private-
public key pair and then generating a new certificate 
signed using the private key from the user’s long-term 
credential. This process essentially creates a short-term 
binding between the new key pair and the user’s identity. 
To authenticate using a proxy credential, a user presents 
both the proxy certificate and the long-term certificate. 
The relying party then verifies that the long-term 
certificate is valid, that the long-term certificate’s private 
key was used to sign the proxy certificate, and that the 
user can demonstrate proof of possession of the proxy 
certificate’s private key. If these conditions (and some 
others regarding certificate format and lifetime) are met, 
then the authentication succeeds, and the user is 
considered to have the identity associated with the long-
term certificate. GSI implements this authentication 
process via the TLS protocol in a GSS-API library. 
In order to support CAS we have also introduced the 
ability for a proxy to carry policy information restricting 
its use. We call a proxy carrying such a policy a restricted 
proxy. We have standardized the format for these proxy 
credentials and have submitted it as an internet draft to the 
IETF PKIX working group [20]. 
2.3 Delegation 
It is often important in distributed applications for a 
user’s application to be able to act, unattended, on the 
user’s behalf. For example, a user may submit a job to a 
remote site, and that job may in turn need to access some 
of the user’s files stored on a mass storage system located 
at a third site. 
GSI allows the user to delegate a proxy credential to a 
process on a remote host; in the example above, the user 
can delegate a credential to the remote job, which can 
then use that credential to authenticate to the mass storage 
system on behalf of the user. The relying party performs 
the same verification as described for proxy certificates in 
Section 2.2, verifying the signatures in the whole 
certificate chain. 
2.4 Authorization 
GSI supports the notion of local policy enforced 
locally. To achieve this, GSI provides mechanisms for 
translating a user’s GSI identity (i.e., the distinguished 
name from the user’s certificate) to a local identity (for 
example, a Kerberos principal, or a local Unix user 
account). Once translated, the local identity can be used to 
enforce local policy decisions, such as file access, disk 
quotas, and CPU limits. 
The Community Authorization Service, described next, 
augments the existing local policy enforcement 
mechanisms provided via GSI. It enables community 
policy to be enforced on the basis of the user’s GSI 
identity, which is constant across resources, rather than 
the local identity that will vary from resource to resource. 
It is because the CAS works with GSI identities that 
scalability with increased resource count is achieved.  
3 Community Authorization 
As we indicated in the introduction, the fundamental 
problem that we address in this work is the scalable 
representation and enforcement of access policy within 
distributed virtual communities. Such communities may 
comprise many members, each participating as resource 
provider and/or resource consumer. In such settings, 
expressing policies in terms of direct trust relationships 
between producers and consumers has the problems of 
scalability, flexibility, expressibility, and lack of policy 
hierarchy. 
We address these problems by introducing a trusted 
third party, a community authorization service (CAS) 
server that is responsible for managing the policies that 
govern access to a community’s resources. 
The CAS server contains entries for CAs, users, 
servers and resources that comprise the community and 
groups that organize these entities. It also contains policy 
statements that specify who (which user or group) has the 
permission, which resource or resource group the 
permission is granted on, and what permission is granted. 
What permission is denoted by a service type and an 
action; the action describes the type of action (e.g., “read” 
or “execute program”), and the service type defines the 
namespace in which the action is defined. Different 
resource servers may recognize different service types, 
but all resource servers that recognize the same service 
type should share the same interpretation of that service 
type’s actions.  
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Figure 1: In order to gain access to a CAS-managed 
community resource, a user must first acquire a 
capability from the CAS server. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, a member of a community 
may send the CAS server a request for a capability that 
will allow the user to perform a set of actions; if that 
request is consistent with the community’s policy, the 
CAS server will delegate an appropriate capability back to 
the user. The user can then use that delegated credential to 
authenticate to a resource server and exercise the rights 
described by the capability.  Of course, this authentication 
and exercise of rights is effective only if the resource 
provider has granted those rights to the community. 
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Figure 2: A CAS capability is used to authenticate 
to the resource. This action can be repeated using the 
same capability until it expires. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, when the user presents the 
capability to a resource, the resource grants the user 
access to the local community resources based on local 
policy for the community (determined using the resource 
server’s normal local access control mechanisms) and the 
community policy for the user (determined by examining 
the policy statements carried in the capability). In other 
words, the resource server will permit a request 
authenticated with a capability if the resource server’s 
local policy authorizes the request for the grantor of the 
capability, and the capability itself authorizes the request 
for the bearer. 
This structure addresses the scalability problem by 
reducing the necessary trust relationships from CxP to 
C+P: each consumer needs to be known, and trusted, by 
the CAS server, but not by each producer; each producer 
needs to be known and trusted by the CAS server, but not 
by each consumer. Of course, the CAS server itself is a 
potential bottleneck and single point of failure, but 
standard replication techniques can be used to address this 
concern. 
This structure also addresses flexibility and 
expressibility by allowing producer-community 
agreements and community policies to be expressed 
directly within the CAS server. Thus, for example, it is 
straightforward for a provider to agree to provide 10% of 
their resources to a community, and for the community to 
decide to provide 30% of its aggregate resources for one 
purpose.  
Finally, by externalizing policy enforcement into a 
third party server, it is possible to set up specialized 
policy servers, representing sub-communities within a VO 
or completely different VOs. 
In the rest of this section, we provide more details on 
these interactions between the CAS and the different 
parties. 
3.1 CAS: Community Perspective 
An individual representing a community can 
instantiate a CAS server by acquiring an identity 
certificate for the CAS server, doing some initial 
configuration, and running the CAS server software. That 
individual can then send requests to the CAS server to 
enroll users and resources into the server (thereby 
identifying them as members of the community) and to 
create policy information (e.g., to create groups of users 
or resources, or to grant access on a group of resources to 
a group of users). 
Depending on a community’s policies, a CAS server 
may have a single administrator who controls everything, 
or it may take a more distributed approach. For example, 
having administrators in geographically distinct areas who 
can enroll users but not add them to groups, and allowing 
Principal Investigators to maintain the membership of 
groups that represent people working on their projects but 
not enroll new users.  
In our implementation, management of the CAS server 
is supported through a command-line tool (useful for 
automated processes) as well as a GUI interface. CAS 
also supports the notion of groups, both of users and 
resources, thus allowing the community to have different 
roles within the community and to grant members the 
rights of those roles by assigning them to the appropriate 
groups. 
Community users request a capability for a set of 
actions from the CAS server using the CAS client library 
or tools built on it. The user uses the capability to 
authenticate to a resource server and exercise the rights 
described by the capability. The request action can be 
easily integrated with existing applications, as we discuss 
in Section 6, either by wrapping the application in a 
program call that makes the appropriate request or by 
adding to the application a call to a simple client API we 
have developed. 
3.2 Resource Provider Perspective 
A resource provider that wishes to accept credentials 
from CAS servers must be able to enforce not only its 
own local policies but also the community policies carried 
in CAS credentials. To accomplish this task we designed 
and implemented a policy evaluation API. Server 
software on the resource must be modified to use this API 
for parsing and evaluating the policy statements contained 
in CAS credentials. 
Once a resource provider has installed the appropriate 
resource server software, that provider can grant access to 
specific resources to specific communities by using local 
access-control mechanisms to grant access to those 
resources to the subject names associated with those 
communities’ CAS servers. Prior to granting that access, 
the resource providers may use offline methods to verify 
that the CAS server is run by someone who actually 
represents the community, and that the community’s 
policies are compatible with those of the resource 
provider. For example, the resource provider may require 
that the CAS server administrators verify that new users 
agree to a certain Acceptable Use Policy before being 
enrolled into the CAS server. 
4 Enabling Mechanisms 
The development of a CAS implementation requires 
three major extensions to GSI mechanisms (Section 2): 
restricted proxy credentials that allow for fine-grained 
control of delegated rights; a policy language for 
specifying the rights carried in the restricted proxy 
credentials, and libraries and APIs to facilitate the 
delegation of restricted proxies by the CAS server and the 
enforcement of proxy restrictions by resource providers. 
4.1 Restricted Proxy Credentials 
The CAS server grants rights to community members 
by using GSI delegation mechanisms to grant them proxy 
credentials. GSI originally supported only a simple form 
of delegation, namely impersonation. However, in most 
cases it is inappropriate for the CAS server to delegate all 
of its authority to a user, because a community’s access 
control policy usually grants different sets of rights to 
different users. 
We have extended the GSI delegation feature to 
support rich restriction policies to allow grantors to place 
specific limits on rights that they grant. We accomplished 
this by defining extensions to X.509 Certificates to carry 
restriction policies [20]; we call a proxy carrying such a 
restriction policy a restricted proxy. CAS servers use 
these restricted proxies to delegate to each user only those 
rights granted to that user under the community’s policy. 
The CAS server uses restricted proxy credentials to 
delegate to each user only those rights granted to that user 
by the community policy. The CAS server delegates the 
user a restricted proxy credential that both authorizes the 
user to act as a member of the community and limits what 
the user can do as part of that community. 
Some applications base authorization decisions on the 
comparison of two identities (for example, a peer-to-peer 
application may permit access if and only if the remote 
and local identities are the same).  This comparison 
becomes meaningless for proxy credentials, because the 
same entity may grant proxies to several different 
individuals.  We have implemented a hierarchical "proxy 
group" mechanism that enables the grantor of a proxy 
credential to associate a group name with each proxy 
certificate it grants, so that these applications can use  the 
combination of issuer identity and proxy group (for 
example, a peer-to-peer application may permit access if 
and only if both the remote and local issuer identities and 
proxy groups are the same).  The CAS server uses a 
different proxy group for each session.  
4.2 Policy Language 
Our restricted proxy credential format is designed to be 
neutral to the actual policy language employed and can 
support arbitrary policy languages such as Controlled 
English [21], ASL [22], or Ponder [23]. In our 
specification we do not state a specific language to be 
used, but instead have a field in restricted proxies that 
specifies the language of the policy carried by the proxy. 
GSI also treats the policy as opaque, meaning that only 
the creator of a policy and resources enforcing it need to 
understand it. This allows us to evolve our policy 
language over time as new requirements are understood, 
and as policy languages themselves evolve. 
For our initial implementation of CAS, we chose to 
implement a simple policy language consisting of a list of 
the rights granted. Each right consists of a list of object 
names and a list of allowed actions on those objects. 
Although this simple language is obviously not rich 
enough to cover the whole range of applications, it has 
proven useful in our initial application case study (Section 
6). We will continue to evaluate and compare various 
existing and emerging policy languages for their 
applicability to Grid applications. 
4.3 Libraries and APIs 
Policies carried in restricted proxy credentials need to 
be evaluated by resources accepting these credentials for 
authentication. To accomplish this task we designed and 
implemented a policy evaluation API and library. 
Internally our implementation uses the Generic 
Authorization and Access control (GAA) API [24] 
because of its ability to be configured to allow pluggable 
modules for acquiring, parsing and evaluation of policy; 
this flexibility is an essential requirement for supporting 
new policy languages that we may choose to use in the 
future.  
GSI uses the Generic Security Services API (GSSAPI) 
[25] as its API, with extensions that we have designed and 
developed to support security features required in 
advanced Grid applications, specifically delegation 
flexibility and mechanisms to extract information. We 
have documented our extensions in an Global Grid Forum 
draft [26] to encourage their implementation in other 
GSSAPI libraries. 
5 Implementation 
We have implemented a CAS server, administrative 
clients for managing community policy information, and 
end-user client applications. These programs are all 
written in python and built on the pyGlobus wrappers [27] 
for the Globus Toolkit. 
We have developed an Authorization API and library 
that services accepting CAS credentials can use to 
evaluate the policies contained in those credentials. We 
have also modified an FTP server to use this authorization 
library and accept restricted proxy credentials. 
As we describe in the following section we have then 
built on these tools to integrate CAS into a real 
application. 
6 Earth System Grid Case Study 
We describe here an early CAS application, namely 
file access control within the Earth System Grid (ESG) 
[28], a distributed network of storage systems containing 
environmental data. In particular, we integrated CAS 
access control with the Visual Climate Data Analysis 
Tool (VCDAT) [29], an interactive tool that allows 
environmental scientists to select from and visualize a 
large collection of (potentially replicated) climate data. 
ESG data is stored in a distributed system consisting of 
a metadata service, a replica manager, and a number of 
geographically and administratively distributed FTP 
servers. The metadata service lists available datasets, 
information about the data in each set, and the logical 
filenames of the datasets. The replica manager [30] maps 
from logical filenames to physical locations (i.e., 
hostnames and paths). Datasets are stored on the FTP 
servers, with each dataset generally replicated on multiple 
servers for locality and reliability. VCDAT processes user 
requests by consulting the metadata service to discover 
available datasets. It presents this information to the user 
who selects one or more datasets for visualization. For 
each dataset selected, VCDAT consults the replica 
manager, discovers where the data is located, selects an 
FTP server, downloads the data from the server, and then 
renders it for the user. 
Prior to the work described here, access control within 
VDCAT was handled via manual updating of access 
control lists at individual FTP sites. As discussed earlier, 
this approach has significant scalability and usability 
difficulties. There are also expressiveness limitations: for 
example, some Unix systems cannot enforce the policy 
“these five people may read this file, and these three 
people may write it.” 
A CAS server solves these problems by giving both 
users and resource administrators a single point of contact 
for dealing with each other. For example, when a resource 
administrator decides to make resources available to the 
ESG community, they first grant access to the ESG CAS 
server using their existing local mechanisms. In the ESG 
case, this consists of creating a Unix account, using 
standard GSI mechanisms to map the ESG CAS server’s 
subject name to that Unix account, and granting file 
permissions to that account. Note that the administrator 
needs to perform this process only once. If the resource 
administrator later decides to grant the community access 
to additional resources, or to revoke the community’s 
access to some resources, then that administrator can do 
so using the same local mechanism (in this case, by 
changing file system permissions). The resource 
administrator does not need to be involved when 
individuals join or leave the community, or when an 
individual’s role within the community changes. 
A new ESG user needing access to the climate data 
now needs only to go to the ESG CAS administrator to 
obtain needed rights. The CAS administrator simply adds 
the user to the CAS database, putting them in the groups 
appropriate to the ESG community policy. The ESG CAS 
administrator can be someone more closely tied with the 
ESG community than the FTP administrators and hence 
more familiar with ESG users and the community 
policies. Depending on the community’s policies, the 
CAS administrator may also delegate some of the 
responsibility for maintaining the CAS database—for 
example, the CAS administrator may grant the authority 
to enroll new users to several people at different 
geographic locations, or may grant the principal 
investigator of a project the authority to add people to or 
delete people from a group of project participants. 
A modified VCDAT client contacts the ESG CAS 
server before downloading the data and retrieves a CAS 
credential granting rights to access the data. It then uses 
the CAS credential to authenticate to the FTP server and 
retrieve the data using standard Globus software. All this 
extra activity involving the CAS is performed 
transparently to the user. 
We have prototyped the above CAS-enabled system 
and verified it works as expected. Modifying the VCDAT 
client was trivial, requiring only a dozen or so lines of 
code changes. 
7 Security Considerations 
7.1 Restricted Proxy Certificates 
The security implications of restricted proxy 
certificates are discussed in detail in [20]. To summarize, 
we have tried to ensure that an entity cannot delegate 
more authority than it has and that a server process that 
does not know how to enforce the restrictions in a 
restricted proxy certificate will reject the certificate 
outright. The effective validity time for a proxy certificate 
(restricted or otherwise) is the intersection of the validity 
times of all the certificates in the certificate chain; the 
effective set of allowed operations is the intersection of 
what's allowed by all the certificates in the chain. Proxy 
restrictions are encoded in a critical X.509 extension, so 
restricted proxies are rejected by authentication libraries 
that don't understand restrictions. The authentication 
libraries that do understand restrictions reject restricted 
proxies unless the calling program has indicated its 
willingness to enforce proxy restrictions. 
We do not currently provide a mechanism for the 
revocation of proxy certificates, relying instead on their 
short lifetimes. 
7.2 Compromised CAS server 
If a CAS server is compromised or untrustworthy, it 
can issue credentials that do not reflect the policies of the 
community that it represents; for example, it may grant 
access to people who are not members of the community. 
A resource provider would honor such a credential for 
any access that its local policies grant to that community. 
A compromised CAS server might also issue 
credentials that (attempt to) grant access to resources that 
don't belong to the community, but unless a resource 
server has been configured to grant access on those 
resources to that community, those credentials will be 
rejected. 
If a CAS server is discovered to have been 
compromised, resource servers can use their local access 
control mechanisms to revoke any permissions granted to 
that server. 
7.3 Revocation Mechanisms 
If a user credential is compromised, then that user can 
be unenrolled from the CAS server (i.e., removed from 
the list of users in the community). The CAS server will 
then refuse to delegate any credentials to that user; 
however, any credentials previously delegated to that user 
will continue to be honored until they expire. 
Credentials issued by the CAS server to community 
members, like most GSI proxy credentials, are given 
relatively short life spans, usually on the order of hours. 
This allows these credentials to be used without the use of 
a revocation mechanism since they generally expire 
rapidly enough for most applications. 
7.4 Compromised Resource Server 
Although a compromised or untrustworthy resource 
server is likely to be a serious problem (e.g., if a 
community stores sensitive files on that server), this does 
not create cascaded security issues. For example, if a user 
uses a CAS credential to authenticate to a compromised 
resource server, that server cannot use that CAS 
credential to gain additional access, because the resource 
server never sees the private key. 
For highly-sensitive applications where greater 
assurance of resource enforcement of community policy 
is required, a mechanism such as Law-Governed 
Interaction [31] can be used to help assure this. 
8 Related Work 
The Akenti system [7, 8] identifies a set of 
stakeholders with a resource, where each stakeholder is 
allowed to place restrictions on who and how the resource 
can be used. These restrictions are specified in terms of 
what attributes a user must possess in order to perform 
specific requests. If all stakeholders approve a request, 
then the request may be performed. Akenti makes 
extensive use of PKI certificates for encoding both user 
attributes as well as usage conditions. Our work is 
distinguished by its focus on supporting the centralized 
specification of community policies governing collections 
of resources, such as who is allowed to read and write 
replicated data in a Data Grid; Akenti, on the other hand, 
is concerned primarily with expressing the use conditions 
that govern access to individual resources. This different 
focus leads us to adopt different technical approaches. For 
example, in Akenti every resource must know about and 
trust the CA of every potential user, which seems to us to 
be a significant obstacle to scalability. In contrast, a CAS 
server must know about and trust the CA of every user, 
but individual resources need know about only the CAS 
server’s CA. Similarly, a CAS server provides a 
centralized location at which can be collected the various 
use conditions that govern access to a resource; once 
these are verified, the resource need deal only with a 
single capability, rather than consulting a potentially large 
set of repositories to find all the applicable use conditions 
and attribute certificates. Finally CAS provides a 
mechanism to delegate permissions on a set of resources 
distributed across different administrative domains. We 
believe that for these reasons CAS represents an 
interesting alternative—and most likely complementary—
technology to Akenti; for example, Akenti could be used 
as the “local” access mechanism in the CAS model. 
The Secure Virtual Enclaves (SVE) infrastructure [32] 
provides a mechanism for the controlled sharing of 
resources among organizations.  An enclave is a set of 
resources managed by the same organization. An SVE is a 
collection of subsets of one or more enclaves. Local 
enclave administrators grant permissions on types (groups 
of resources, or of operations on resources, within the 
local enclave) to domains (groups of users), possibly 
subject to additional conditions. The mapping of 
resources to types, and the granting of permissions on 
each type, is done within each local enclave and not 
shared with other enclaves in the SVE; however, the 
specification of domains is shared across enclaves within 
an SVE (i.e., if the administrator of any enclave within an 
SVE adds a user to a domain, that user will be considered 
part of that domain within the entire SVE). SVE provides 
“interceptors,” middleware components for some software 
architectures, that enable the use of SVE without 
modifying application-level code. 
The SVE approach has some features in common with 
the CAS approach. Both frameworks allow local resource 
administrators to determine the upper bound of what 
access is granted to the community, while allowing 
people other than the local administrators to specify some 
parts of the effective policy. Both frameworks also 
support the aggregation of users and resources.  The SVE 
approach allows an enclave to export resources to more 
than one SVE; the CAS approach allows resource 
providers to grant permissions to more than one 
community. However, there are significant differences.  
The SVE model seems to be focused on relationships 
among organizations, while the CAS model is focused on 
the relationships between organizations and communities 
and among individuals within a community.  In the SVE 
model, all policy is managed by enclave administrators, 
and all enclave administrators have equal authority to 
maintain the membership of domains (user groups). In the 
CAS model, course-grained access control is maintained 
by local resource administrators, and fine-grained access 
control is maintained by a community representative, who 
may delegate out subsets of that authority; neither the 
original community representative nor anyone to whom 
this authority is delegated is required to be a resource 
administrator. This delegation of administrative authority 
may also be very fine-grained; for example, a community 
administrator may create a group and delegate to an 
individual the authority to add established community 
members to and delete them from that group, without 
giving that person any other administrative authority. The 
SVE model allows aggregation of resources, but only 
within an enclave; the CAS model does not have that 
restriction. We have found that communities often wish to 
grant permissions to collections of resources that belong 
to different organizations; for example, in data grids [33], 
multiple replicas of a file, which generally should have 
identical access control policies, typically exist on servers 
in different organizations. The SVE project has 
concentrated more than the CAS project on programming 
frameworks. 
The theoretical concepts of proxy certificates, 
restricted proxies, and authorization servers that generate 
proxy certificates were described in [10]. 
9 Future Directions 
9.1 Accounting 
Many policies contain quotas or similar rights that are 
dynamic in that they depend on a user’s current resource 
consumption. For example a user may be assigned a quota 
on the total amount of storage they can consume by 
community policy, meaning the amount of new data a 
user can store is the difference between the quota and 
amount they have currently stored. 
CAS currently works with statically defined rights. For 
CAS to enforce these policies a distributed accounting 
system must be put into place to provide feedback on the 
user’s resource consumption across all resource servers. 
The development of such a system can be expected to be 
complicated, due to the need to communicate usage 
information from resources to CAS as well for standard 
methods for describing resource usage. 
We plan to experiment with an approach to this 
problem based on tagging each restricted proxy issued by 
the CAS with a Globally Unique ID (GUID). This GUID 
will be used by resources to track resource consumption 
and report it back to CAS. CAS will then map the GUID 
back to the original user and keep track of the resources 
being consumed by the user. 
Additional areas we intend to research that are needed 
to complete the accounting system are tools for allowing 
resources to log usage, protocols and tools for distributing 
this accounting information back to the CAS, and policy 
languages for expressing limits on the amount of resource 
consumption allowed by a user.  
9.2 Delegation tracing 
While thinking of an individual as simply a member of 
a community is acceptable for the purpose of 
authorization, there are instances where resources will 
want to know the actual identity of a user. Auditing is a 
common reason for this, so that if malicious behavior is 
attempted it can be tracked back to an individual. 
To enable this functionality we are investigating 
methods of tracing delegations. This would allow a party 
accepting a credential to be able to determine the identity 
of the party to whom the credential was delegated and 
hence the identity of the user who accepted the credential 
from CAS. 
9.3 Replication of CAS Server 
A system based on a single CAS server for a 
community may have the problem of being a single point 
of failure as well as a potential performance bottleneck. 
We will explore methods of replicating the CAS server to 
alleviate this potential problem. The best approach will 
depend on how often we see the community policy 
changed in practice. If community policy tends to be 
changed infrequently we can define a single master server 
that can accept changes and then routinely replicates the 
policy to one or more read-only slave servers. If the 
community policy changes frequently we will require a 
more complicated distribution among a set of peer servers 
where all can act to update the policy and the loss of any 
one server does not lead to a loss of functionality. 
10 Summary 
This paper describes the Community Authorization 
Service (CAS) we have developed to solve three critical 
authorization problems that arise in distributed virtual 
organizations: scalability, flexibility and expressibility, 
and the need for policy hierarchies. We address these 
problems by introducing a trusted third party administered 
by the virtual organization that performs fine-grain 
control of community policy while leaving ultimate 
control of resource access with the resource owners. We 
also describe our experience integrating CAS with a real 
world application. This experience provides us with some 
initial evidence that CAS is a viable solution to our target 
problems. 
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